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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
O~~H.\LD QlT~DHY and 
1 
BRYCE~ T.\ \'"L<)R, I 
Plaintiff's a~nd Appellants, 1 
-\·~.-
ST.\T~} <lF lrTAH; LOUIS 
llOJl ~~Xl~O, Fiscal Officer, Utah 
Iligh\\·ay Patrol: LYLE HYATT, 
Commander, lTtah Highway Patrol; 
and ClJ~\IR R. HOPKINS, 
Chairman, Utah Commissioner 
of f,ina nre, 
/Jefe,ndants and Respondents. 
l 
r 
\ 
I 
j 
Case 
No. 10090 
Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
ST~\TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This \\·as an action for declaratory judgment to de-
termine 'vhether the Utah Highway Patrol could validly 
retain contributions made by Plaintiffs-Appellants to the 
Utah Higlnvay Patrol Retirement Fund. Plaintiffs prayed 
for a declaration for refund, based on favorable inter-
pretations of l .... C. A. 49-8-1 to 49-8-5, as amended. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Stewart 
M. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial District, sitting with-
out jury. From a decree denying Plaintiffs' prayl~r, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the decree en-
tered by the Trial Court and seek a further decree, de-
claring that Plaintiffs-Appellants are entitled to refund 
of their contributions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs initiated action for declaratory judgment, 
praying that the Trial Court declared the retention of 
Plaintiffs' contributions to the Utah High"'\\"'ay Patrol 
Retirement Fund by the Utah Commissioner of Finance 
void and against public policy. Plaintiffs prayed for re-
fund of the amounts contributed by them during their 
employment. 
The Defendants contended that a refund 'ras not 
available because the statutes did not provide for a re-
fund and by the absence of a provision for refund, the 
legislature manifested its intention that such contribu-
tions by employees of the High,vay Patrol be forfeited 
when employment is terminated prior to retirement age. 
The Defendants also denied the refund on the basis that 
the Plaintiffs, during their employment 'vith the High-
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
way Pntrol, \\·C'rP advised of the forfeiture of any contri-
hnt ion~ n1ade hy t hP Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiffs 
roH~Pnh•tl to such forfPiture. 
ln ,·ic\v of the absence of any statutory provision 
pt.'rtnitting or dPnying refund of contributions made by 
Hi~hway Patrolmen, the primary problem at trial 'vas to 
tlt'tt'rminP thP legislative intent in regard to possib]c 
rt•fnnd~. 
rrhroughout the trial, Plaintiffs contended that the 
legislature intended a refund of contributions made hy 
llig-hway Patrolmen, and a Statutory provision permit-
ting ~neh refund was omitted by inadvertence and not by 
th,~ign. This contention was based on the fact that the 
h~g-i~laturc provided for a refund to all members and em-
ployPPs of other State, County and Municipal agencies. 
Also. Plaintiffs contended that the Trial Court should 
not construe a statute to permit forfeiture unless the 
eYidenee at trial clearly showed a contract for forfeiture. 
This contention is based on the policy established by the 
tnajority of the Courts. 
The Defendants, on the other hand, contended that 
the Plaintiffs agreed to the forfeiture, and such agree-
ment created a binding contract upon the Plaintiffs for 
the forfeiture of all contributions made by Plaintiffs to 
the lTtah HiglnYay Patrol Retirement Fund. The De-
fendants further contended that the legislature purposely 
omitted provision for refund and that such omission 
rP~ulted after the legislature carefully studied and ana-
3 
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lyzed the actuarial reports presented to them of the 
Highway Patrol Retirement program. 
The Trial Court denied the Plaintiffs' petition for 
dec-laratory judgment in their favor. The decision of the 
Court was based on the finding that the statutory proYi-
sions in question did not provide for a refund, as con-
trasted to the statutory provisions of the other retire-
ment programs which permitted refund. The Court fur-
ther found that the legislature intended that no refunds 
be permitted in the interest of inducing employees of the 
Highway Patrol Department to make a life career of the 
Highway Patrol and to keep the retirement fund on a 
sound basis. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTER-
PRETATION OF SEC. 49-8-1, ET SEQ., U. C. A., 
1953, AS AMENDED. 
The pertinent statutory provisions in question, 
48-8-1, et seq., U. C. A., 1953, as amended, create a re-
tirement fund for male employees of the Utah High,vay 
Patrol. The provisions of this statute do not provide for 
or deny refund of contributions 'vhich are made by the 
Highway Patrolmen when employment is terminated 
before the employees qualify for retirement. X otwith-
standing the absence of any clear indication as to the 
legislative intent regarding refunds of contributions, the 
Trial Court determined that the Plaintiffs-1~ppellants 
'vere not entitled to refund of their contribution to the 
retirement fund. In effect, the Trial Court has adopted 
a construction of the statute involved to permit a for-
4 
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feiture without proof that the legislature, in fact, in-
t .. nded a forfeiture. 
The Ia"~ regarding forfeitures is clear and of long 
~tnnding in tTta.h and in our sister states; the law abhors 
forfeitures unless the statute or written agreement clear-
ily indicatPs that a forfeiture " 7as intended. 
In .1/or.flan v. Sorensen, 286 P. 2d 229 3 U. 2d 428, 
t.he lTtah Supreme Court was confronted with a case in-
volving the interpretation of a statute on forfeitures of 
mining claims. In denying forfeiture, Justice Crockett, 
~pl'aking for the majority, stated: 
'' \\r e should show the same liberality in construing 
the suspension statute as has been used in con-
~truing the assessment work requirement, for the 
same purpose of avoiding forfeitures, which are 
re_qarded odious to the law." (Emphasis added) 
The Supreme Court of California has also taken 
the ,·ie"· that a. statute will not be construed to work a 
forfeiture \vhich would work a harsh and unjust result 
in absence of a clear indication by the legislature that it 
~o intenrlPd. In Jfadera County v. Gendron, 382 P. 2d 
:l-l~. 31 Cal. Rptr. 302, the California Supreme Court was 
n~kPd to affirm a judgment which declared that because 
tht' district attorney had violated a statute which pro-
hibited pri,·ate practice, he had forfeited his pay as dis-
trict attorney. 
In reversing the Trial Court's decision, the Supreme 
Court ~tated: 
''To adopt the construction urged by the Plaintiff 
would cause a. forfeiture, which 'vould work a 
5 
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harsh and unjust result; lre are reluctaut so to 
construe the sta.tute in the absence of a clca r iurri-
cation by the legislature that it so intended. (~l(·t­
ropolitan Water District v. Adams (1948), :~~Cal. 
2d 620, 197 P. 2d 543; Bakkenson v. Sup(~rior 
Court (1925) 197 Cal. 504, 241 P. 847). To 'rith-
hold all salary from the District .1\ ttornev in order 
to effectuate the section is to use a blu~1t inRtru-
ment of enforcement, despite the availability of 
more sensitive sanctions 'vhich may be tailored to 
the nature and gravity of the breach. 
"We hold, therefore, that the defendant may law-
fully receive his salary during his term of office, 
notwithstanding his failure to conform to the I>ro-
scription upon engaging in the priYate practice of 
I " aw ... 
The rule on forfeitures applies to contractual pro-
visions as well as statutory provisions. In Grarnt v. Pal-
freyman, 166 P. 2d 215, 109 P. 291, our Supreme Court 
was confronted with a claim of forfeiture on a construc-
tion contract. In reversing the Trial Court's judgment 
for forfeiture, the Supreme Court of Utah held: 
''Forfeitures are not favored and in interpreting 
an agreement, every reasonable presumption 
should be indulged against an intention to allo'v a 
forfeiture." (See also: Swain v. Salt I.Jake Real 
Estate Investment Company, 279 P. 2d 709, 3 U. 
2d 121.) 
In a California case involving the interprteation of 
certain provisions in a contract, the Supreme Court of 
California stated : 
''The contract makes no provision for its termi-
nation or for the forfeiture of the interest of 
6 
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either party. If uo forfeiture is to occur b.lJ rir-
lltt' of a prorisiou of an agreement, surely noue 
f'an be freated upon the demand and for the ac-
('nnunodafion of one of the parties." Plante v. 
Oray, 157 I>. ~d 421, 68 CA 2d 582. (Emphasis 
ndde(l) 
In Uadach v. f>rior, 297 P. 2d 605, 48 vVash. 2d 901, 
the ~npreme Court of Washington denied a forfeiture 
nnd stated: 
"Forfeitures are not favored in law, and equity 
'"ill seize upon inequitable circumstances arising 
from contract or conduct of the party in order to 
nvoid a forfeiture." 
The reference books are replete \vith annotations 
of en~es denying the validity of forfeiture clauses in 
contract, and the cases appear to generally hold that the 
courts abhor forfeiture clauses and forfeiture as a rem-
t'dy for the aggrieved. The language used in 12 A1n. Jur., 
rantracts. Section 436, appears to be the general atti-
tude of all the Courts toward forfeitures. Portions of 
this section read as follows: 
'~Forfeitures are not favored by law; indeed, they 
are regarded "~ith disfavor. It is well settled that 
forfeitures hy implication or by construction, not 
compelled by express requirements, are regarded 
\Yith disfavor. Contracts involving a forfeiture 
cannot be extended beyond the strict and literal 
meaning of the \Yords used. Since forfeitures ~~re 
not favored either in equity or in law, provisionG 
for forfeitures are to receiYe, \Yhere the intent is 
doubtful, a strict construction against those for 
""hose benefit they are introduced. Courts are re-
luctant to declare and enforce a forfeiture, if by 
7 
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reasonable interpretation it can be aYoided.'' ( pp. 
1016-17). For further reference, see Par. Dig. 
CONTRACTS, Key No. 3, Sec. 18. 
It is obvious that the law as to forfeitures is a firm 
and established rule, even in cases \vhere the parties 
have by writing agreed to the forfeiture. Certainly, in 
cases where no writing can be produced to establish tlw 
forfeiture, and the pertinent statutes are silent as to thr 
intent of the legislature, the Court should not establish a 
forfeiture agreement merely on the demand of one party: 
nor should the Court infer from the statutes that thP 
legislature, in fact, intended a forfeiture \vhere ~uch f< 11'-
geitures are frowned upon by the Courts and the pre-
sumption lies against forfeitures . 
.&.~t trial, the defendants offered several argument~ rP-
garding statutory constn1ction \vhich may \\"'arrant con-
sideration here. 
Initially, defendants argued that since no provif4ion 
for refund "'as made by the legislature, the legislature 
must have intended a forfeiture. Ho\V0Yer, it is equally 
feasible to believe that a provision for refund "~a~ inad-
Yertently omitted, and this, especially, since the provi-
sions for all other retirement funds permit at least par-
tial refund. 
The defendants also argue that the ''mention of one 
thing implies the exclusion of another.', As rules for 
statutory interpretations go, the Plaintiffs offer no re-
buttal to this maxim. This rule, how·ever, is inapplicable 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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hen', since the entire controversy arises from the fact 
that the legislature did not ''mention'' anything in regard 
to rt-fund of contributions. Defendants further contend-
ed that when the language is clear and unambiguous, no 
other intPrpretation is permitted. Again, this rule is in-
applicable here, as the conflict arises not from ambiguity 
of 'vords, but the absence of it. 
Defendants next contended that the presumption of 
constitutionality rests with each statute until such pre-
sumption is overcome by clear evidence. The Plain tiffs 
do not deny that such is the rule, but merely urge that a 
statute should not be construed to effectuate a forfeiture 
without clear eYidence that the legislature intended such 
a forfeiture. 
Finally, Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs have 
no \·ested interest in the retirement fund and are, there-
fore, not entitled to refund. The Plaintiffs have never 
claimed any vested interest in the retirement fund, as 
~neb. They merely contended that they have an interest 
a~ to their respective contributions to the fund. Cer-
tninly, Plaintiffs have not met the requirements for re-
tirement and are, therefore, not entitled to any retire-
ment benefits from the retirement fund. On the other 
hand, the contributions made by Plaintiffs were made out 
nf their 'vages. This amount was part of their monthly 
eompensation and as such, should be returned to them. 
Such a refund would not be unprecedented, notvvithstand-
ing the absence of statutory authority, and would merely 
be a refund of " .. ages 'vithheld. 
9 
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In Sommers v. Patton, 399 Ill. 540, 478 N.E. 2d 31:1, 
an employee demanded return of his conribution to re-
tirement fund which was classified as a public employee 
fund. The custodian of the retirement fund denied the 
refund. In permitting the refund, the Illinois Supreme 
Court stated that the refund 'vas, in fart, a final releHf-;P 
for prior \Yage deductions. 
The defendants urged that the legislature purpose]~· 
omitted a refund clause in creating the Utah Higlnray 
Patrol retirement because all other retirement funds spe-
cifically provide for refund of contributions, and had thP 
legislature intended refund, the statute would have so 
provided. Yet the opposite of this is equally logical. All 
other retirement funds were created prior to the High-
way Patrol Retirement Fund, and it ""ould seem to fol-
low that the legslature intended to give all public em-
ployees a refund of their contributions if employment 
was voluntarily terminated; that the legislature inad-
vertently failed to provide for refund in this case. Since 
all other retirement funds for governmental employees of 
Utah are allowed refund, it would seem that the High-
""ay Patrol should not be excepted, unless specifically 
excepted b~,. statute. In 50 Anl. Jur., ~C,'fatutes, Section :1~G, 
in regard to the legislatiYe silence or acquiescence~ it i~ 
stated that ''It is the general rule that the intent of the 
legislature is indicated b~· its action, not by its failure to 
act.'' Further, at 50 _A 111. Ju r., Statutes, Section 348, the 
authors state: 
''It is a fundamental rule of statutory constrnr-
tion that sections and acts in pari materia, and all 
parts thereof, should be construed together, and 
10 
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compared "ith each other. No one act, or portion 
of all the nets, should be singled out for consid-
Prntion apart from all the legislation on the sub-
jPet. Under this rule, each statute or section .is 
eonstrued in the light of, with reference to, or 1n 
eonnection with, other statutes or sections. Re-
course is had to the several statutes or sections for 
the purpose of arriving at a. correct interpretation 
of any particular one. The object of the rule is 
to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of 
the legislature. It proceeds upon the supposi-
tion that the several statutes were governed by 
one spirit and policy, and were intended to be 
consistent and harmonious in their several parts 
and provisions.'' 
Section 349 of the same volume and heading reads as 
follows: 
''Under the rule of statutory construction of 
statutes in pari materia, statutes are not to be con-
sidered as isolated fragments of la,v, but as a 
'vhole, or a.s parts of a great, connected homoge-
neous system, or a single and complete statutory 
arrangement. Such statutes are considered as if 
they constituted one act, so that sections of one 
act may be considered a.s though they were parts 
of the other act, a.s fa.r as this can reasonably be 
done. Indeed, as a general rule, where legislation 
dealing 'vith a. particular subject consists of a 
system of related general provisions indicative of 
a settled policy, new enactments of a. fragmanta.ry 
nature on that subject are to be taken as intended 
to fit into the existing system and to be carried 
into effect conformably to it, and they should be 
so construed as to harmonize the general tenor or 
purport of the system and make the scheme con-
sistent in all parts and uniform in its operation, 
unless a different purpose is shown plainly or with 
11 
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irresistible clearness. It 'vill be assumed or prr-
sumed, in the absence of words specifically indi-
cating the contrary, that the legislature did not 
intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or 
violate a. general statute or system of stautory pro-
visions the entire subject matter of which is not 
directlv or necessarilY involved in the art " 
•' . . 
Section 350 reads : 
''Although there may be statutory proYISions 
which, in a sense, relate to the same rna tter and 
yet, are not in pari materia, thP general rule i~ 
that statutes or statuory provisions ·w·hich relatP 
to the same person or thing, or to the same clas~ 
of persons or things, or to the same or a closel~· 
allied subject or object, may be regarded as pari 
materia. Statutes which have a common purpose, 
or the same general purpose, or are parts of the 
same general scheme or plan, or are aimed at tlw 
accomplishment of the same results and the sup-
pression of the same evil, are also ordinarily re-
garded as in pari material. This is true of stat-
utes which have for their common purpose the 
carrying out specifiically of the mandate of the 
same constitutional provision.'' 
By these rules of statutory interpretation, the statu-
tory provisions of the High"ray Patrol Retirement Fund 
would have to be analyzed in conjunction w·ith all of Title 
49, U. C. A., 1953, as amended, since all section~ and 
chapters under Title 49 deal specifically 'vith retirement 
funds for State and governmental employees. The logi-
cal conclusion from such analysis would be that the leg-
islature intended to give all such employees, including 
High,vay Patrolmen, a refund of their respective con-
tributions to their retirement funds "?hen the employees 
12 
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terminated employment prior to meeting the require-
meut~ for rPtirPment. 
The Trial .Judge ha.s held and the defendants urged 
that the legislature omitted a refund clause because it 
intended that the retirement fund be kept on a. sound 
ba~is. It \vould seem that the legislature intended that 
all retirement funds be kept on a. sound financial basis. 
'rhP judgment of the Trial Court also indicates that the 
legislature intended to induce HiglT\vay Patrolmen to 
make the Highway Patrol Department a life career. It 
would appear that the legislature intended to induce all 
State and other governmental employees to make their 
johs life rareers. The very existence of all of the retire-
ment funds would seem to indicate that the legislature 
intended to induce permanent employment with gov-
ernmental agencies. It does not follow that the absence 
of a refund rlause is a special indication by the legislature 
that it intended the forfeiture of contributions if High-
way Patrolmen decided to terminate their services with 
that Department. The inducement, if any, would seem 
to be the creation of the fund - not the absence of a 
refund cia use. 
X o evidenc-e "~as presented a.t the trial upon which 
the Trial Court's judgment could be supported. The 
judgment rendered below, denying Plaintiffs' prayer for 
refuntl. effects a forfeiture without clear evidence that 
the legislature intended a forfeiture. 
The Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Trial 
Court's ruling is simply the declaration of a forfeiture 
' 
13 
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'vhich is not supported by evidence or ~tatute; and tlll1 
judgment should, therefore, be reversed, and a judgment 
entered, declaring Plaintiffs eligible for refund of their 
contributions. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Trial Court is simply a declara-
tion permitting forfeiture of Plaintiffs' contributions to 
the Utah Highway Patrol Retirement Fund. The judg-
ment is not supported by evidence and should, therefore, 
be reversed, and a judgment entered, declaring Plain-
tiffs eligible for refund. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH M. HISAT"'"t\J\:E 
445 East Second South, No. 7 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellants 
14 
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